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Abstract:  There have been concerns about the increasing concentration in 
the meat packing industry. But this increased concentration may be due to 
various types of cost economies. In this paper we prove the existence of 
scale economies that might justify the increased consolidation in the 
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IS PRICING ABOVE MARGINAL COST AN INDICATION OF 
MARKET POWER IN THE U.S. MEATPACKING INDUSTRY? 
 
  1.1 Statement of the Problem 
Many times we have heard the expression “extraction of market 
power” or “oligopolistic conditions” for a specific industry.  This means that 
firms in that market price above marginal cost of production. Figure 1 below 












   Figure 1 
 But is it really pricing above marginal cost an indication of exercising 
market power or is it the result of cost economies under which firms operate   4
in this industry?  In this case Figure 2 represents what is happening for a 













    
       Figure 2 
 
As we can see from figure 2, the price in this industry is above marginal 
cost, but there is no exertion of market power.  The industry in order to 
avoid losses, prices its product above marginal cost where price equals 
average cost and consequently economic profits equal zero. 
  Thus, before we make rush judgments about the degree of 
competitiveness of an industry as concentration increases, we should take into 
account any cost economies that might exist.  By cost economies we mean 
   5
short-run (utilization), long-run (scale), scope (output jointness) and multi-plant 
(information and risk-sharing) may provide incentives for expanding output, 
size, diversification, and plant numbers.  
In this paper we are going to find out what is really happening in the   
U.S. meatpacking industry.  Is it really the case that firms exercise market 
power in this market, or the situation described in figure 2 characterizes the 
specific industry? 
 
1.2  Literature Review 
Paul Cathy Morrison in her paper: “Market and Cost Structure in the 
U.S. Beef Packing Industry: A Plant Level Analysis.” American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 83(1) (February 2001), pp.64-76, comments that 
increasing size of plants and firms in the beef-packing industry could also be 
indicative of the efficiency potential from scale, scope, multi-plant, and 
other types of cost economies, which could allow larger and more diverse or 
specialized plants or firms to increase their cost effectiveness.  Modeling and 
measuring the market power and technological structure in this industry to 
explore these questions involves appropriate representation of both the 
oligopsony/poly nature of the industry, and the production/cost structure. 
Characterization of market power depends on the cost structure, because it   6
involves comparing the average prices of an output or input to its associated 
marginal valuation – the marginal shadow value for the input, or the 
marginal cost for the output. Careful representation of costs, with 
recognition of scale, size, utilization, and scope economies, is therefore 
important to the construction of the market power.  Her results indicated 
little if any existence of market power in the beef-packing industry, and 
significant cost economies in this industry. 
Paul Cathy Morrison in her paper: “Cost Economies and Market 
power: The case of the U.S. Meat Packing Industry.” The review of 
Economics and statistics 83(3) (August 2001), pp.531-540, by utilizing a 
dynamic model based on a restricted Generalized -Leontief cost function 
finds out significant but declining market power and cost economies in the 
U.S. meat packing industry.  Analysis of the cost structure, suggests 
utilization issues and long-run scale economies being the main forces 
driving expansion in the scale of production.  
This paper differs from the above mentioned papers in the sense that 
we have no input fixities.  We test our model within a long-run framework, 
where everything is flexible.  
Finally this paper is related to the master’s thesis of D. Panagiotou: 
“Cointegration, Error Correction and the Measurement of Oligopsony   7
Conduct in the U.S. Cattle Market”, 2002, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 
because it moves downstream in the marketing channel.  That paper used an 
error correction model to find out if beef packers (which can be considered a 
category of meatpackers) exert oligopsony power when they purchase their 
primary input: cattle.  The assumption there was that the packers are price 
takers when they sell their product. The results indicated no market power in 
the short-run as well as in the long-run.  In this paper we assume that 
packers are price takers when they purchase cattle, but they might exert 
market power when they sell their output. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
  We make use of the framework that E. Appelbaum uses in his paper: 
“The Estimation of the Degree of Oligopoly Power.” (Journal of 
Econometrics  9(1979), pp.287-299). We consider a possible non-
competitive industry, in which j firms produce a homogeneous (in the eyes 
of the consumer) output Q (meat), with each firm producing qj. Each firm 
uses m inputs X1,…..Xm, in order to produce the desirable output. 
Let the inverse market demand curve facing the industry be given by 
P = P(Q). Then the Profit function for each firm can be written as: 
 Пj= P(Q) qj -  ( ) j q C    8



































 - MC( j q ) = 0               (1) 
 
 
In equation (1), the second term of the summation includes the inverse of the 
demand elasticity of the industry,  
 
 










                           
 
 
and the conjecture for each firm: 
 






= θ      
   
Thus, equation (1) can be written:  
 
                P(Q) + P (Q) 
η
θ j
 - MC( j q ) = 0                                   
 
 
If we aggregate across the firms of the industry, and at the same time 
multiply each term by 
Q
q j   we are going to get: 
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=1 represents the weighted average of 
the conjecture for each firm, and can be replaced byθ ; where θ  is an 
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where with the ratio   ϕ
η
θ
=  we represent the market power that firms 
exercise in this industry: 
 









 = 0                     (3) 
 
 
Under the assumption that firms have identical marginal costs (access to 
same technology), we can write equation (3) as: 
 
() ϕ − 1 P   -  ( ) q MC  = 0                             (3a) 
 
 
Equation (3a) is the first equation that we should keep in mind because is 
going to be relevant in the econometric analysis.   10
Now we are going to look at the cost structure of the industry, in order to use 
it for the derivation and estimation of the marginal cost, the average cost.  
We are doing this because it is going to be very helpful in our analysis for 
the cost economies that might exist in this industry. 
   If we let the cost function to be represented by a Generalized-Leontief 
function, then the total cost for each firm can be written as: 
() () ( ) ( ) n j i w b q g w w d q h q C i
n
i
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and the marginal cost can be derived as: 






















      
In this paper we are going to use the following specifications:      
                         ( ) j j q q h = and ( )
2
j j q q g = .  
     These  are  specifications  that  Olson and Shien (1989) and Baffles and 
Vasavada (1989) first introduced (see references for their papers):  
Thus, the marginal cost takes the form: 
    





















2                        (4)   11
If we additionally assume that the firms use m inputs, then for the 
Generalized- Leontief cost function, the optimal input demand functions are 
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and dividing by qj we get: 
≡ j i q X / () i j i m
n
m




/       m i ,.... 1 = ∀      (5)   
Combining equations (3) and (5) we are going to get a system of equations, 
with the help of which we can estimate the parameters of the cost function as 
well as the index of market powerϕ . 
From our function specification for the cost we use in this paper we 
already derived the marginal cost in equation (4).  The average cost for the 
Generalized- Leontief cost function we use in this paper is:  
 AC =  =
q
C
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Dividing equation (4) with equation (6) we get: 
       =
AC
MC
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 is negative, then MC is 
less than AC and we have cost economies, which in our case is going to be 
scale economies (size increase), since we examine the industry in a long-run 
framework.  So in this case figure 2 is going to give us the best picture about 
what is happening in the industry.  





 is positive, then MC is greater than AC then there is no 
indication about cost economies, and figure 1 is relevant in our analysis for 
this case. 





 is not statistically different than zero, then MC is equal to 
AC and we have constant returns to scale, and firms are making zero 
economic profits. 
 If  φ = 0 then price equals marginal cost from equation (3a), and in the 
long-run we are going to have an equilibrium where price equals marginal 
cost and both of them equal the long average cost, and that’s the case where 
we have zero economic profits and exertion of market power in the specific 
industry.  
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3. Econometric application 
   3.1 Data 
 We use data from 1958 to 1996 for the U.S meatpacking industry, 
obtained from the National Bureau of Economic Research.  The data include 
observations on the slaughtering of cattle, hogs, sheep, lambs, and calves for 
meat to be sold or to be used in canning, cooking, curing, and freezing, and 
in making sausage, lard, and other products.  
   We have four competitively priced inputs, labor (XL), capital (XK), 
materials (XM), and energy (XE) whose prices are WL, WK, WM, WE 
respectively and Q is the quantity produced and piship is the price of the 
product.  In the appendix there is a description of the data: 
                              
          
 3.2  Empirical  results 
The Generalized-Leontief cost function in equation (4) takes the form:  














and we are going to have four equations, one for each input, of the form: 
≡ q X i / () i i m
m
im b q w w d + ∑
=
5 . 0 4
1
/       14
  For empirical implementation the model has to be estimated within a 
stochastic framework.  To do this, we assume that equations are stochastic 
due to errors in optimization.   
Although the equation by equation OLS estimation might appear 
attractive, since the equations are linear in the parameters, these demand 
equations have cross-equation symmetry constraints, and the OLS method is 
not going to impose the symmetry condition.  In our study we use the 
Zellner’s seemingly unrelated estimator (ZEF) in order to obtain efficient 
parameter estimates. 
   We define the additive disturbance term in the i
th equation at the time t 
as ei(t), t=1,….,T. We also define the column vector of disturbances at the 
time t as et.
  We also assume that the vector of disturbances is jointly 
normally distributed with mean vector zero and non-singular covariance 
matrix Ω, 
() () [ ] Ω = ′ Ε t e s e j j  
    if t = s,    
      =   0     if t ≠ s. 
Estimating the system of the four equations along with equation (3a), we get 
the following results: 
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 Nonlinear SUR Parameter Estimates 
 
          Approx                  Approx 
       Parameter       Estimate     Std Err    t Value     Pr > |t| 
 
      φ               0.156827      0.0270       5.81       <.0001 
      DKK             -0.05816      0.0204      -2.85       0.0074 
      DKL             0.003408    0.000711       4.79       <.0001 
      DKE             -0.00374     0.00546      -0.69       0.4977 
      DKM             -0.02564      0.0180      -1.42       0.1633 
      DLL             0.000468    0.000599       0.78       0.4402 
      DLE             0.000504    0.000268       1.88       0.0679 
      DLM             0.001068     0.00188       0.57       0.5734 
      DEE             -0.00128     0.00522      -0.25       0.8076 
      DEM             0.000948     0.00535       0.18       0.8603 
      DMM             1.073771      0.0387      27.71       <.0001 
      bk              1.738E-6    2.165E-7       8.02       <.0001 
      bL              -3.18E-9    8.383E-9      -0.38       0.7072 
      bM              -3.32E-6    5.965E-7      -5.57       <.0001 





Covariances of Parameter Estimates 
 
                 F          DKK          DKL          DKE          DKM 
 
  F      0.0007285    0.0000344    -.0000010    0.0000051    0.0000064 
  DKK    0.0000344    0.0004162    0.0000018    -.0000108    -.0002771 
  DKL    -.0000010    0.0000018    0.0000005    0.0000013    -.0000086 
  DKE    0.0000051    -.0000108    0.0000013    0.0000299    -.0000259 
  DKM    0.0000064    -.0002771    -.0000086    -.0000259    0.0003242 
  DLL    -.0000078    -.0000007    0.0000000    -.0000000    0.0000000 
  DLE    0.0000001    0.0000003    0.0000000    0.0000001    -.0000006 
  DLM    -.0000197    -.0000043    -.0000003    -.0000018    0.0000083 
  DEE    -.0000038    0.0000174    -.0000001    -.0000085    -.0000050 
  DEM    -.0000034    -.0000043    -.0000011    -.0000185    0.0000275 
  DMM    0.0007129    0.0001874    0.0000135    0.0000554    -.0003628 
  bk     -.0000000    -.0000000    0.0000000    0.0000000    0.0000000 
  bL     0.0000000    0.0000000    -.0000000    0.0000000    -.0000000 
  bM     -.0000000    0.0000000    -.0000000    -.0000000    -.0000000 
  bE     0.0000000    -.0000000    -.0000000    -.0000000    0.0000000 
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DLL          DLE          DLM          DEE          DEM 
 
  F       -7.81E-6    1.4294E-7    -.0000197    -.0000038    -.0000034 
  DKK    -7.325E-7    2.8444E-7    -.0000043    0.0000174    -.0000043 
  DKL    1.8818E-8    2.9803E-8    -.0000003    -.0000001    -.0000011 
  DKE    -3.859E-8    8.8369E-8    -.0000018    -.0000085    -.0000185 
  DKM    4.605E-10    -5.525E-7    0.0000083    -.0000050    0.0000275 
  DLL    3.5909E-7    -1.522E-9    0.0000004    0.0000002    -.0000000 
  DLE    -1.522E-9    7.1594E-8    -.0000001    -.0000002    -.0000010 
  DLM    3.5419E-7    -1.126E-7    0.0000035    0.0000008    0.0000026 
  DEE    2.2289E-7    -1.761E-7    0.0000008    0.0000273    -.0000017 
  DEM     -9.37E-9    -9.941E-7    0.0000026    -.0000017    0.0000286 
  DMM    -8.599E-6     3.139E-6    -.0000497    -.0000231    -.0000761 
  bk     1.575E-11    3.606E-13    -.0000000    -.0000000    0.0000000 
  bL     -4.76E-12    1.439E-13    -.0000000    -.0000000    -.0000000 
  bM     1.594E-10    -2.34E-11    0.0000000    0.0000000    0.0000000 
  bE     -3.51E-12    1.593E-11    -.0000000    -.0000000    -.0000000 
 
               DMM           bk           bL           bM           bE 
 
  F      0.0007129    -9.62E-10    9.845E-11    -1.402E-8    2.413E-11 
  DKK    0.0001874    -2.841E-9    4.137E-12    2.4087E-9     -7.2E-11 
  DKL    0.0000135    6.329E-11    -2.06E-13    -4.76E-11    -4.08E-12 
  DKE    0.0000554    2.917E-11    1.028E-12    -6.45E-11    -6.43E-11 
  DKM    -.0003628    3.522E-10    -7.34E-13    -5.06E-10    1.261E-10 
  DLL    -.0000086    1.575E-11    -4.76E-12    1.594E-10    -3.51E-12       
  DLE    0.0000031    3.606E-13    1.439E-13    -2.34E-11    1.593E-11 
  DLM    -.0000497    -8.21E-12    -7.92E-12     3.93E-10    -2.22E-11 
  DEE    -.0000231    -6.46E-11    -5.22E-12    5.719E-10    -3.49E-10 
  DEM    -.0000761    4.735E-12    -1.48E-12    1.818E-10    -8.74E-11 
  DMM    0.0015013    1.2435E-9    1.486E-10    -1.752E-8    6.438E-10 
  bk     0.0000000    4.689E-14    -7.59E-17    -3.43E-14    5.899E-16 
  bL     0.0000000    -7.59E-17    7.027E-17    -2.29E-15    1.095E-16 
  bM     -.0000000    -3.43E-14    -2.29E-15    3.558E-13    -1.26E-14 
  bE     0.0000000    5.899E-16    1.095E-16    -1.26E-14    9.328E-15 
 
 
  As we can observe there is indication of market power, since φ equals 
to 0.1568, and is quite significant.  But, as we stated in the theoretical 
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where the prices of the factors of production are estimated at the means. 






=  k Kw b + E E M m L L w b w b w b + + = -1.13E-06 
 
 
and the estimated variance of the sum is found by the multiplication of the 
matrices below: 
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t-stat -3.28   18





 is negative, and significantly 
different than zero. So, in our case the ratio MC/AC is less than zero, indicating 
scale economies in the industry. 
 
 
 4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this paper is to examine if in the U.S. meatpacking industry 
the indication of pricing above marginal cost is a sign of existence of market 
power or Figure 2 describes what is happening in the industry.  By utilizing a 
Generalized-Leontief cost function, we found out that the estimated parameter 
ϕ   for the market power is statistically significant, and the ratio of (MC/AC) 
is significantly less than one.  Hence figure 2 describes what is happening in 
the specific industry.  Thus, we have low Marginal Cost as compared to 
Average Cost, and even though the price mark up is significant, it is supported 
by scale economies which are just high enough to allow average costs to be 
covered. We use the world scale economies to describe the case of cost 
efficiencies (or economies) we have here, because our model examines the 
industry within a long-run framework.    19
The above analysis is relevant for antitrust authorities and policies that try 
to force downsizing in an industry like the one we analyzed in this paper. The 
results indicate that an increase in concentration in the industry might be 
welfare enhancing for consumers because it can lead to lower prices because 
of the economies of scale. Thus, in this case, increased concentration in an 
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    Appendix: 
 
 
1) Description of the Data 
   
        The SAS System                            
                                          
                          The MEANS Procedure 
 
Variable    Label      N            Mean         Std Dev         Minimum 
Q           Q         39        42580.34         5161.22        29654.34 
piship      piship    39       0.7305897       0.2986963       0.3350000 
wm          wm        39       0.6957436       0.2980598       0.3070000 
wk          wk        39       0.6576923       0.3674194       0.2460000 
we          we        39       0.6407179       0.4043910       0.2040000 
wl          wl        39      22.5246080       6.0746394      13.3351186 
XK          XK        39     356.9177167      72.3127443     243.1208054 
XL          XL        39     250.4230769      34.5653802     197.6000000 
XM          XM        39        38879.45         4241.61        29825.36 
XE          XE        39     284.4098174      40.3584273     224.8826291 
                    
Variable    Label          Maximum 
 
                   Q           Q             48917.45 
                   piship      piship       1.1990000 
                   wm          wm           1.1580000 
                   wk          wk           1.2800000 
                   we          we           1.1740000 
                   wl          wl          29.0935484 
                   XK          XK         500.8064516 
                   XL          XL         312.7000000 
                   XM          XM            46014.80 
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